

cises on a well-developed literature like that on polarization can be immensely valuable. This is especially true when previously unnoticed causal dynamics and interactions are established. Unfortunately, Theriault's project falls short of his goal of a unified model of polarization.

Much of the problem lies in the structure of the analysis. Despite the aspirations for integration, the bulk of the analysis lies in five chapters focused on distinct causes of polarization: gerrymandering, constituency sorting, activist polarization, procedural choice, and the transmission of partisan norms from the House to the Senate. In each case, the dependent variables are measures of partisan polarization. Consequently, the intervening causal steps postulated by his model remain largely unexamined. Moreover, very little attention is paid to the relative timing of changing of key variables in a way that would establish the causal priorities laid out in the model. It is not enough to show that legislators faced more partisan constituencies and more partisan legislative rules. The logic of Theriault's model is that the constituency change happened first and led to greater delegation to leaders. Yet, evidence on that point is not examined.

Nevertheless, Theriault might have achieved some degree of integration had his individual analyses been carried out in common metrics of polarization. But alas, they were not. The effects of gerrymandering are estimated on distributions of presidential votes; the effects of constituency preferences, activist preferences, and House membership are carried out on DW-NOMINATE scores; while the effects of procedural choice are carried out on party voting scores on key legislation. Consequently, when Theriault makes comparative claims like factor  $x$  accounts for  $w\%$  of polarization while factor  $y$  accounts for  $z\%$ , he is often comparing apples and hand grenades.

Despite falling well short of its goal of integration and unification, Theriault's book does make a solid contribution to the study of congressional polarization. Much new data as well as original analyses are brought to bear on what is now a central question in American politics. It is unfortunate that his findings are as disjointed and fragmented as the literature that he justly criticizes.

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**America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11** by Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier. New York, Public Affairs, 2008. 432 pp. \$27.95.

The notion that "everything changed" on 11 September 2001 assumed the status of conventional wisdom in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States on that now infamous day. In their wide-ranging history of American foreign policy from the end of the Cold War to September 11, Derek Chollet, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and James Goldgeier, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, firmly rebut that contention.

Chollet and Goldgeier persuasively argue that the major threats that confronted America in the wake of the attacks of September 11, namely, terrorism, failed states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and global economic instability, had in fact vexed U.S. policymakers for over a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. Cleverly bounding their survey by employing the dates of 11/9 and 9/11 as bookends, the authors review the major foreign policy decisions and developments of the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton presidencies, particularly: the 1991 Persian Gulf War and subsequent coercive diplomacy against Iraq; humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo; counter-terrorism strikes against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan; and crucial economic decisions to pursue the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement and World Trade Organization, and to bail out the Mexican peso.

*America Between the Wars* is a solid introduction to the history of post-Cold War American foreign policy. It is relatively comprehensive in scope, and it is written in a refreshingly unpretentious and accessible manner. Perhaps its chief merit, though, is that it not only reconstructs the key events of the 11/9–9/11 epoch, but it also instructively depicts the underlying intellectual battles over competing visions of U.S. grand strategy that transpired within and between the Democratic and Republican Parties during that period. Chollet and Goldgeier meticulously track how the Democrats shed their post-Vietnam dovish tendencies in favor of a more-hawkish liberal interventionism during the Clinton years, while the Republicans abandoned the establishment of internationalism epitomized by the first Bush presidency in favor of the more-isolationist and unilateralist stance adopted by the congressional Republican majority that took power in 1995. Meanwhile, the Democrat-turned-Republican neoconservative faction, which favored the robust use of American military power on behalf of humanitarian causes, but which was highly skeptical of multilateralism, initially flirted with the Clinton administration, but increasingly gravitated back toward the Republicans, achieving intellectual predominance within the George W. Bush presidency after September 11.

Unfortunately, these strengths are counterbalanced by two significant weaknesses. First, Chollet and Goldgeier refrain from providing a coherent analytical framework for either explaining or evaluating U.S. foreign policy decision making during the chaotic decade of the 1990s. Their overarching thesis, that the Bush I and Clinton administrations had to grapple with the same problems that took center stage after September 11, is too nebulous and underdeveloped to impose sufficient discipline on the flood of otherwise-disparate events discussed in the historical narrative. Second, although the authors conducted an impressive array of interviews with many of the key figures who played a role in the events of the 11/9 to 9/11 period, the work contains few insights that readers already familiar with the subject matter will find new and revealing.

In sum, *America Between the Wars* will be a useful historical primer for students and non-experts, but does not exhibit the analytical or empirical depth

that would justify its inclusion on the reading lists of foreign policy scholars and analysts already quite familiar with the chronicle it recounts.

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**American Power and the Prospects for International Order** by Simon Bromley. Oxford, Polity Press, 2008. 288 pp. \$29.95.

**Managing American Hegemony: Essays on Power in a Time of Dominance** by Kori N. Schake. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 2009. 172 pp. \$15.00.

Simon Bromley's *American Power and Prospects for International Order* and Kori N. Schake's *Managing American Hegemony: Essays on Power in a Time of Dominance* present readers with two books that while they share a common theme—understanding how the United States became the leading power in the international system and what this means for the future—are quite different in style and purpose. Bromley's book is a detailed and historically contextualized treatment of post-World War II U.S. foreign policy that is geared to a professional audience and requires a close reading in order to gain an appreciation for the fullness of his argument. Schake's book is a quicker read that is far more focused on the contemporary world situation. As befitting her position as a senior adviser to John McCain's presidential campaign, Schake's book has the feel of a foreign policy primer, ending with a chapter on recommendations for the next president. Bromley's analysis shares with Schake's a concern over many of the same issues: the rise of challengers (most notably China), the problem of American debt, the functioning of international institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the contours of American power.

American hegemony serves as the starting point for Schake's analysis as she asserts that "the international order, therefore, is probably stuck with American hegemony, unless we destroy it ourselves" (p. 4). The roots of American hegemony are seen as residing in a convergence of economic, military, diplomatic, cultural, and linguistic power on the one hand and, on the other, a dynamic political culture and economic system that champions change and rewards risk taking but does not overly penalize failure. These traits are especially valuable, Schake argues, in a globalized world, and globalization is the starting point for her analysis of American foreign policy. She observes that while globalization seems natural to most Americans, not only is it seen as threatening by many around the world, but it is also seen as an American creation, with globalization and Americanization treated as synonymous. Addressing European concerns in particular, Schake attributes this view to fears about how the international order is changing and Europe's collective

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